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This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high mar-
ket prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition
and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the
pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies
during the auction.I show that when there are two licenses for sale the only
equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward
induction is the one where ﬁrms bid an amount (almost) equal to the proﬁts
of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy
in the market game resulting in high prices. With three or more licenses the
auction format determines whether the forward induction argument works.
1 Introduction
One of the most debated questions concerning the recent wave of spectrum auctions
held around the world is whether auctions give rise to higher prices in the market
∗An earlier version of this paper was entitled Auctions as Collusion Devices.It h a n kK e nB i n -
more, Paul Klemperer, Benny Moldovanu,Giancarlo Spagnolo, Elmar Wolfstetter and participants
of presentations at ESEM 2003, Erasmus University and the AMD 2003 conference (Milan) for
helpful comments.
†Address for correspondence: prof. Maarten Janssen: Department of Economics, H07-22, Post-
box 1738, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Phone: 31-10-4082341, Fax:
31-10-4089149, E-mail: janssen@few.eur.nl.
1after the auction. Firms tend to stress that they have to recover the money they
spend on obtaining a license and therefore tend to set higher prices when auction
revenues are high. Economists tend to the view that payments during an auction
should be considered as a sunk cost at the moment ﬁrms compete in the market place.
According to the economic point of view, there is, or should not be, any relation
between auction revenues and market prices (see, e.g., Binmore and Klemperer
(2002)). Recent experiments show, however, that auctioning rights to compete in
the market does lead to higher market prices (see, Oﬀerman and Potters, 2000).
Formally, the sunk cost argument is based on the notion of subgame perfection.
This notion basically says that at the beginning of each subgame (read: after some
auction outcome is observed and market competition starts) players should look at
the future and choose strategies that form an equilibrium in the subgame. The
behaviour that has lead to a particular subgame is not relevant for the strategic
analysis of that subgame. With multiple equilibria in a subgame, subgame perfection
does not give clear guidance to players what to choose. In this case, the notion of
forward induction (see, e.g., Van Damme, 1989, Osborne, 1990, Ben-Porath and
Dekel, 1992) may complement an analysis in terms of subgame perfection. Under
forward induction, past behaviour may signal which future play is intended. Using
this idea, this paper argues that market competition and bidding in an auction
should be analyzed as part of one game, where bidding behaviour in the auction
may signal pricing behaviour in the market game.
The paper analyzes a situation with N bidders. The prize that the winners of
the auction get is the right to play the market game. In its most simple form,
the market competition game is analyzed as a coordination game in which ﬁrms
can either follow a competitive strategy resulting in relatively low proﬁts if both
decides to do so or a more cooperative strategy with relatively high proﬁts. What is
important for the argument to hold is that the market game has multiple equilibria
and that the strategy space is ﬁnite.1
The formal results are as follows. With two licenses for sale the claim is that
the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward
1In theoretical IO models, price, quantity and other decision variables are typically modelled as
continuous variables. However, discrete variables are typically more realistic: prices have to be set
in cents and ﬁrms in the real world tend to consider only certain ”psychological” prices (ending on
5o r9 ) .
2induction is the one where ﬁrms bid an amount (almost) equal to the proﬁts of
the cooperative market outcome and follow the cooperative strategy in the market
game. In other words, the auction solves the coordination game at the market
level in favour of the high proﬁt equilibrium at the market stage. With three or
more licenses for sale, the validity of the forward induction argument depends on
the type of auction that is chosen. For simultaneous ascending auctions, where
bidders can react on each others´ bids, the above argument can be adapted and the
result carries over. When the licenses are allocated using some type of sealed-bid
auction, the forward induction logic does not apply, however, and I obtain the more
standard argument that bidding behaviour in the auction and strategic behaviour
in the market are not connected. The diﬀerences in results indicate, once more, that
details of auction design may have important implications for the ﬁnal outcome.
An interesting side issue that comes out of the proof is that during the bidding
stage in the game, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to introduce a ”jump bid” (see also
Avery, 1998). The size of the jump is given by the diﬀerence between the maximal
proﬁts that can be obtained by following a competitive market strategy and the
overall minimum pay-oﬀ winners of the auctions could make in the aftermarket. The
jump is necessary to convince others that they will follow the cooperative strategy
in the aftermarket.
Intuitively, what the forward induction argument establishes is that by integrat-
ing the auction game and the market game into one larger game, auction expen-
ditures are no longer sunk in the larger game. By looking at the market game
separately, auction expenditures are indeed sunk, but at the auction stage they are
not! Therefore auction expenditures may signal the intention to play a high proﬁt
equilibrium in the market game.
Forward induction has ﬁrst been used in the ”burning money” argument in game
theory (see, e.g., Van Damme, 1989, Osborne, 1990, Ben-Porath and Dekel, 1992 and
Rubinstein, 1990). The basic idea in this literature is that coordination problems
like the ones in Battle-of-the-Sexes games can be resolved if one of two players
before playing the game has the option to burn some money. The forward induction
argument that is used in this literature is quite similar to the one applied in this
paper although there are some major diﬀerences. First, in an auction all players,
and not just one, have the possibility of ”burning money”. Second, the competitive
3pressure present in auctions makes that in the resulting equilibrium, players do burn
money, whereas the equilibrium that is selected in the burning money/Battle-of -
the-Sexes example, players do not burn money. The fact that nothing is burnt,
leads to a fundamental issue regarding game theoretic modelling (see Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994, p. 113): One may always argue that players have the possibility
of burning money, but as nothing is burnt it is diﬃcult to perceive this as a signal as
it is not clear whether the other player considered the possibility of burning money
in the ﬁrst place. My argument is not prone to this objection as the equilibrium
that is chosen has players ”burning money”.
The forward induction argument has been used in a loose way in two closely
related papers discussing auctioning the rights to play a coordination game. Van
Huyck et al. (1993) discusses an experiment where the right to play a series of
coordination games between nine players is auctioned oﬀ between 18 players. In the
auction, an auctioneer keeps on raising the stakes until nine bidders remain. They
ﬁnd strong evidence that auctioning the rights to play the coordination game makes
players coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Crawford and Broseta (1998)
provides a theoretical model explaining the experimental evidence. The model is
based on a history-dependent learning dynamics. Even though both papers mention
the similarity of their work to the intuition of the forward induction logic, they
explicitly reject the formal forward induction argument as the explanation for the
experimental evidence.2 The main diﬀerence, therefore, between the present paper
and these two papers is that I show that the formal forward induction argument can
be used. In addition, details of the auction design do matter (see above).3
The paper is also related to recent literature on the interaction between auctions
and aftermarkets. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996a, 1996b, 2001) study the way ex-
ternalities in the aftermarket have an impact on bidding behavior in the auction.
2In the abstract to their paper, for example, Crawford and Broseta (1998, p. 198) argue
that ”the eﬃciency enhancing eﬀect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction, but it is not
explained by equilibrium reﬁnements”.
3It is true that forward induction does not have the necessary bite in the formal game analyzed
by Crawford and Broseta (1998), see p. 205 of their paper for more details. Another diﬀerence
relates to the interpretation of the results. Crawford and Broseta (1998) use the term ”eﬃciency-
enhancing” as the Pareto-superior equilibrium is a high eﬀort equilibrium in a game where players
choose eﬀort in a production process, which presumably is good for both everyone in the model
economy. In our setting, the Pareto-suprior equilibrium is a high proﬁt equilibrium, which generally
leads to low levels of consumer surplus and to overall ineﬃciencies.
4They show that, depending on the speciﬁc context, standard properties of auctions
do not hold when bidding ﬁrms also interact after the auction outcome has been
established (see also, e.g., Das Varma, 2002). Signalling does not play a role in these
papers. Signalling does play a role in Goeree (2002). In that paper players have
private information that eﬀects aftermarket competition. He shows that players may
have an incentive to overstate their private information in an attempt to inﬂuence
the behavior of competitors in the aftermarket. This paper, therefore, falls in the
tradition of signalling models where actions (in this case, ﬁrms bidding behavior)
may reveal a player’s type. In contrast, I look at a situation where private informa-
tion does not play a role and past actions signal future actions, instead of a player’s
private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the model in
case two licenses are auctioned oﬀ. Section 3 contains the main proposition and its
proof for this case of two licenses. Section 4 discusses details of the k ≥ 3 license
case and Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2 The Model and Solution Concept
There are N ﬁr m s .T h eg a m et h eﬁr m sp l a yi sat w o - s t a g eg a m e .I nt h eﬁrst stage
the ﬁrms bid in an auction. The two ﬁrms with the highest bid continue to the
second stage where they play a market competition game. If there is a tie for the
ﬁrst and/or second highest bid, a lottery will determine the ranking of the bids.
The bids of the two players that continue to play the market competition game are
denoted by x1 and x2, respectively, where x1 ≥ x2. Players have to pay their own
bid in case they continue to the second stage of the game. Each ﬁrm can win at
most one license. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, the next section
analyzes a discriminatory auction where each ﬁrm submits only one (sealed) bid.
F o rt h ef o r m a lp a r to ft h ea r g u m e n ti ti sc o n v e n i e n tt oh a v ead i s c r e t es t r a t e g y
space and therefore, I assume ﬁrms can bid any amount x =  ,2 ,3 ,... The grid  
measures the bidding increment and I assume that   is small.4 In the second stage,
the two winning ﬁrms play a market competition game. Firms can choose to play
4Note that in most auction designs a bid increment of some kind is implemented.
5competitively (aggressively), denoted by A, or cooperatively, denoted by C.T h e








 ,w h e r ea>d≥ b>c>0.
So, the value v of winning the auction is uncertain, and can be equal to a,b,c
or d. Note that the restrictions on the pay-oﬀ parameters imply that there are two
symmetric pure-strategy equilibria: (C,C)a n d( A,A), where the ﬁrst equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the second.5 T h em a r k e tg a m ei sn o tf u l l ys p e c i ﬁed in order to
allow for many diﬀerent interpretations. According to most interpretations, high
proﬁts and high market prices go together. One interpretation is that the market
game is a static game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria as the search model
described in Janssen and Moraga (2003). Another interpretation of the market game
is as a simpliﬁed version of repeated interaction in the market, where cooperative
play can be supported as an equilibrium outcome.6 In line with this second interpre-
tation, I denote the action of player i i nt h em a r k e tg a m eb ypi. The overall strategy
of player i is then denoted by (xi,p i(x1,x 2)).
It is clear that any type of market behavior can be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Underlying the notion of subgame perfection is the view that devia-
tions from a proposed equilibrium strategy are considered mistakes which are not
informative about future behavior (cf., Selten, 1975). The only requirement it im-
poses is that the strategies in the market game form an equilibrium in the market
subgame and in our case there are two equilibria.7 T h ea r g u m e n tIm a d ei nt h e
Introduction, namely that a deviation of a proposed equilibrium bid in the auction
game should not be interpreted as a random mistake, but rather as a signal of future
actions in the market game is what motivates the notion of forward induction (see,
5For the argument that follows it is not necessary that d ≥ b. The assumption is made to avoid
writing max(b,d) each time. Moreover, in line with the collusion and trigger strategy interpretation,
the assumption d ≥ b is more natural than the reverse.
6When we take the fact that licenses are auctioned for a ﬁxed period of time literally, cooperation
can still be an equilibrium outcome for some periods of time if we allow uncertainty a la Kreps et
al. (1982).
7Note that in the present context the notion of backward induction formalises the standard
economists’ point of view of ”auction revenues are sunk cost”.
6e.g., Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Van Damme 1989, and others). An equilibrium
is consistent with forward induction if it is not the case that some player, by deviat-
ing from the equilibrium path, can ensure that a proper subgame is reached where
all solutions but one give the player strictly less than the equilibrium pay-oﬀ,a n d
where exactly one solution gives the player strictly more. Underlying the notion of
forward induction is the idea that deviations from a proposed equilibrium should be
interpreted as signals of future actions, if possible. The solution concept underlying
the argument above is iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEDS).8
3 Analysis for two licenses
In this section, I prove one of the main results of the paper. The result says that
provided the number of competing ﬁrms in the auction is large enough, the forward
induction argument selects only one of the subgame perfect equilibria. The equilib-
rium that is selected has ﬁrms coordinating on the high proﬁt (price) equilibrium in
the market game. Moreover, during the auction phase ﬁrms ”burn” all their future
proﬁts, i.e., their bids are close to the proﬁts obtained in the market game. There
a r et h r e ei m p o r t a n ts t e p si nt h ep r o o f ,n a m e l ys t e p s( ii)-(iv), and I will describe
them informally here. First, the strategy ”bid an amount in the auction game that
is larger than the proﬁts one can maximally achieve by choosing a competitive mar-
ket strategy and choose a competitive market strategy” is dominated as it always
leads to a negative proﬁt. This in turn implies that if one of the ﬁrms that wins
the auction has made a relatively high bid, the other ﬁrm can safely assume that
this ﬁrm will choose to play cooperatively in the market game. Thus, the second
step of the argument argues that strategies of the form ”bid an amount x in the
auction game and choose a competitive market strategy whenever the other winning
ﬁrm has bid an amount that is larger than the proﬁts one can maximally achieve by
choosing a competitive market strategy” is dominated by a similar strategy where
cooperative play in the market game is recommended. These two steps together as-
sure that if someone bids relatively high in the auction, ﬁrms play cooperatively in
8The decision-theoretic foundation of the forward induction argument has been considered weak
as it was thought to rest on the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Recent papers
by Asheim and Dufwenberger (2003a, 2003b) give a much more solid foundation in terms of the
concept of fully permissible sets. Their arguments can also be applied in the present context.
7the market game. The last step in the argument shows that given this anticipation,
competition between a large enough number of contestants in the auction assures
that it is indeed optimal to bid higher than the proﬁts one can maximally achieve
by choosing a competitive market strategy.





n+1} the unique equilibrium that
is consistent with forward induction has xi ∈ [a − 2 ,a) and pi(x1,x 2)=C, i =
1,...,N.
Proof. The proof eliminates sets of strategies in ﬁve consecutive stages. First,
deﬁne for any given natural number n, K as the largest integer such that (K +n+
1) <c .
Step i: Fix an integer k with 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Given that players’ strategies are
restricted to xi ≥ k , a n ys t r a t e g y( xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hxi = k  is iteratively domi-
nated by (e xi, e pi(x1,x 2))w i t he xi =( k+1)  and e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2). The argument
here is quite similar to the conventional elimination of dominated strategies in a
ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. The pay-oﬀs the two strategies yield in the second
stage is the same, because e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2), and at least equal to c.M o r e o v e r ,
the overall pay-oﬀ o fb o t hs t r a t e g i e si sa l w a y sp o s i t i v ea se xi ≤ c− . The ﬁrms thus
try to outbid each other, which is what drives the bids up. The last step of the this
stage of the elimination procedure is the most stringent and gives a good idea about
t h ep r e v i o u ss t e p s . S o ,l e tu sb r i e ﬂy consider the argument for the K’th step. In
the K’th step I have to argue that any strategy (xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hxi =( K − 1) 
is iteratively dominated by (e xi, e pi(x1,x 2))w i t he xi = K  and e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2).
There are three possible situations to consider: Either x2 >K   ,or x2 = K ,o r
x2 =( K −1) . In the ﬁrst case, both classes of strategies (those with xi =( K −1) 
and those with xi = K ) under consideration yield a pay-oﬀ of 0. In the second
case, all strategies with xi =( K − 1)  yield a pay-oﬀ of 0, whereas strategies with
xi = K  yield a positive expected pay-oﬀ. In the third case, the pay-oﬀ of strategies
in the class with xi =( K−1)  yield a pay-oﬀ of at most 2(v−(K−1) )/N,w h e r ev
equals a,b,c or d. The pay-oﬀ of strategies in the class with xi = K  yield a pay-oﬀ
of v − K . This latter expression is not smaller than the ﬁrst expression for any
value of v, if it is larger for v = c.A s (K − 1) <c− (n +2 )  ,t h i si st h ec a s ei f
(n +2 ) ( N − 2) /N ≥  ,o rN ≥ 22+n
1+n.
8Step ii:A n y s t r a t e g y ( xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hxi ≥ d and pi(x1,x 2)=A whenever
xi ≥ x2 is weakly dominated by (e xi, e pi(x1,x 2))w i t he xi <band e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2).
To prove this claim, I will denote the ﬁrst strategy by s1 and the second one by
s2. When player i sets strategy s1, her pay-oﬀ is either 0 or negative. I will show
that by choosing strategy s2, she can never do worse and sometimes better. There
are three possibilities: x2 >x i, e xi ≤ x2 ≤ xi, e xi >x 2. In the ﬁrst case, both s1 and
s2 yield a pay-oﬀ of 0. In the second case, πi(s1,s −i) ≤ 0 ≤ πi(s2,s −i).I nt h et h i r d
case, πi(s1,s −i) < 0 <π i(s2,s −i). Thus, s2 weakly dominates s1.
Step iii:A n y s t r a t e g y ( xi,p i(x1,x 2))t h a ta s s i g n spi(x1,x 2)=A for some value
of x1 ≥ d is weakly dominated by (e xi, e pi(x1,x 2))w i t he xi = xi and e pi(x1,x 2)=C
whenever x1 ≥ d and otherwise e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2).
To prove this claim, note that all strategies (xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hxi ≥ d that
survived IEDS up to this stage have pi(x1,x 2)=C because of step (ii). There are
two cases then to consider: xi <x 2 and xi = x2.9 In the ﬁrst case, both strategies
yield a pay-oﬀ of 0. In the second case, let us denote by m the number of players
with a bid equal to xi. There are two subcases: x1 equals a value larger than or
equal to d to which the ﬁrst strategy assigns pi(x1,x 2)=A and all other values of
x1 including x1 <d .In the ﬁrst subcase, the overall pay-oﬀ of the ﬁrst strategy is
(d−xi)/m,w h e r e a st h ep a y - o ﬀ of the second strategy is (a−xi)/m. In the second
subcase, the actions prescribed by both strategies are identical and, therefore, the
pay-oﬀsa r ee q u a l .
Steps i−iii together assure that if one player bids an amount larger than or equal
to d in the auction, both players proceeding to the second stage of the game will
choose to play cooperatively. The next step argues that all strategies that prescribe
players to bid less than d in the auction are iteratively dominated. To this end let us
denote by b SC(0) the set of strategies {(xi,p i(x1,x 2))| xi >c−2  and pi(x1,x 2)=C
if x1 ≥ d}. Note that this class leaves the second stage action unspeciﬁed whenever
x1 <d . Let us also deﬁne e SC(0) as the subset of b SC(0) with the lowest bid xi, i.e.,
e SC(0) ≡{(xi,p i(x1,x 2))| c − 2 <x i <c−   and pi(x1,x 2)=C if x1 ≥ d}.T h e
lowest bid itself in e SC(0) is denoted by b x(0). Using these two notions, we can deﬁne
b SC(1) ≡ b SC(0)\e SC(0) and similarly to deﬁning e SC(0), one can deﬁne e SC(1) as the
9Note that the case xi >x 2 is covered by (ii) above as it implies that xi = x1 ≥ d.
9subset of b SC(1) with the lowest bid xi, i.e., e SC(1) ≡{(xi,p i(x1,x 2))| c −  <x i <
c and pi(x1,x 2)=C if x1 ≥ d}. Proceeding iteratively, I deﬁne for all k>1,
b SC(k) ≡ b SC(k−1)\e SC(k−1) and e SC(k) as the subset of b SC(k) with the lowest bid
xi. In each round the lowest bid itself in e SC(k) is denoted by b x(k). Finally, I deﬁne
KC as the number of steps   that is needed to reach the interval [d −  ,d] from the
interval [c − 2 ,c −  ].
Step iv:F i x a 0 ≤ k ≤ KC and b SC(k). Given that players’ strategies are
restricted to b SC(k), all strategies in e SC(k) are weakly dominated by the strategy
(xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hd ≤ xi <d+   and pi(x1,x 2)=C for all pairs (x1,x 2) .
To prove this step, let us call the dominating strategy s4. For each k ≥ 0 there
are three situations to consider. Either x2 ≥ d+ , or b x(k) <x 2 <d + ,o rb x(k)=x2.
In the ﬁrst case, all strategies in e SC(k) as well as strategy s4 itself yield a pay-oﬀ of
0. In the second case, all strategies in e SC(k) yield a pay-oﬀ of 0, whereas strategy
s4 yields a pay-oﬀ larger than a−d−  due to the fact that step (iii) implies that if
s o m e o n eb i d sa na m o u n th i g h e rt h a nd,p l a y e r sp l a yC.I nt h et h i r dc a s e ,t h ep a y - o ﬀ
of strategy s4 is still larger than a−d− ,w h e r e a st h ep a y - o ﬀ of choosing a strategy
in e SC(k) cannot be larger than 2(a − c +( n +2 )  )/N. When N ≥
2(a−c+(n+2) )
(a−d− ) ,t h e
ﬁrst pay-oﬀ is not smaller than the second.
Steps i−iv imply that all strategies with bids xi <dare iteratively eliminated.
Both condition on N mentioned in steps i and iv have to be satisﬁed, and we can
choose a natural number n such that the overall condition on N is easiest satisﬁed.
The last step of the argument then is again a conventional auction type of argument.
To this end, deﬁne Kd as the smallest integer such that Kd >dand KA as the
largest integer such that (KA +1 )  <a .
Step v: Fix an integer k with Kd ≤ k ≤ KA − 1. Given that players bidding
strategies are restricted to xi ≥ k , any strategy (xi,p i(x1,x 2))w i t hxi = k  and
pi(x1,x 2)=C for all pairs (x1,x 2) is iteratively dominated by (e xi, e pi(x1,x 2))w i t h
xi =( k +1 )   and e pi(x1,x 2)=pi(x1,x 2). This last step of the argument is, again,
just the conventional argument of elimination of dominated strategies in a ﬁrst
price sealed-bid auction. Given steps (ii)-(iv) ﬁrms always play cooperatively in
the market game, which guarantees a pay-oﬀ of a of winning the auction. Firms
would like therefore, to outbid each other, which drives the bids in the auction up.
The details of the argument are similar to the argument made in step (i)a n da r e ,
10therefore, omitted.
Step (iv) of the proof highlights the use of a ”jump bid”.10 Given the earlier steps
of the proof, a bidder can only guarantee himself the highest possible continuation
pay-oﬀ in the aftermarket, if he chooses a bid that is higher than the maximal pay-
oﬀ of d one could get by following market strategy A. U pt ot h a tm o m e n ti nt h e
auction (proof) only bids smaller than c are eliminated. The size of the jump bid is
thus at least equal to d−c. This step of the proof also makes clear why the forward
induction argument does not work when a clock auction is used.
One issue that remains to be discussed is why the argument only works when
the number of ﬁrms is larger than a speciﬁcl o w e rb o u n do nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms
participating in the auction. The reason is the following. There is a possibility that
bidding stops at the moment all bidders bid an amount xi close to c −  . The two
ﬁrms that are randomly selected face a coordination problem in the market game:
both playing cooperatively and both playing aggresively are both Nash equilibria.
Even though there is no speciﬁc reason to do so, it may thus happen that both ﬁrms
coordinate on playing cooperatively. The total pay-oﬀ for the two ﬁrms of following
this strategy is then smaller than a − c +( n +2 )  . The chance of being selected is
2/N. Note that the expected pay-oﬀ decreases in N as the chance of being selected
in the lottery decreases. Each ﬁrm then faces the following decision problem: being
satisﬁed with this chance of getting a relatively large pay-oﬀ or ”jump bidding” to
ab i dl a r g e rt h a nd, which guarantees a pay-oﬀ of a in the market game. For ”jump
bidding” to be proﬁtable, N h a st ob er e l a t i v e l yl a r g e .
4A u c t i o n i n g k ≥ 3 Licenses
In this Section we analyze to what extent the result of the previous section can
be generalized to the case where k ≥ 3 licenses are auctioned oﬀ.I n o r d e r t o
discuss the implications of this generalization, we ﬁrst need to generalize the market
stage pay-oﬀs to the case where k ﬁrms compete. The pay-oﬀsw h e ne v e r y o n e
behaves cooperatively or aggressively do not need to be modiﬁed. When n<k
10Of course, taking literally jump bidscannot take place in a sealed-bid auction. However, a
similar analysis applies to a multi-unit ascending auction.
11players play cooperatively and the remaining k − n players play aggressively, one
may denote the pay-oﬀ to the aggressors and cooperators by dn and cn, respectively.
It is natural to assume that dn <d n+1 and cn <c n+1, i.e., the more cooperators, the
higher the pay-oﬀs to both cooperators and aggressors. Moreover, I assume that the
structure of the coordination game is unaﬀected, i.e., for every n the following holds:
a>d n ≥ b>c n > 0. The bids of the k players that continue to play the market
competition game are denoted by x1,..,xk, respectively, where x1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xk.
As indicated in the Introduction, the results for the case of k ≥ 3 licenses crucially
depend on the auction format. To see this, I will consider a sealed-bid discriminatory
auction and a simultaneous ascending auction in turn.11
In a discriminatory sealed-bid auction, the forward induction argument does
not work. The overall strategy of player i in such an auction can be denoted by
(xi,p i(x1,x 2,..,x k)). To see why the forward induction arguments fails, consider the
equilibrium in which every player chooses a bid just below b and play aggressively
i nt h em a r k e tg a m e . t h er e a s o nt h a tn oﬁrm wants to deviate and ”signal” the
intention to play C in the market game (bidding high), is that the other k − 1
ﬁrms face the following coordination ”game”. If h<k− 2 out of the other k − 2
winners cooperate, the pay-oﬀ in the market game to a player who didn’t bid above
dk−1 is equal to ch+2 if he himself cooperates and equal to dh+1 >c h+2 if he himself
plays aggressively. On the other hand, if all the other k − 2 winners cooperate, the
pay-oﬀ i nt h em a r k e tg a m et oap l a y e rw h od i d n ’ tb i da b o v edk−1 is equal to a if
he himself cooperates and equal to dh+1 <aif he himself plays aggressively. Thus,
for these players it is optimal to choose C if, and only if, all others play C. In a
simultaneous auction, this type of coordination problem cannot be resolved. This
in turn implies that signalling the intention to play C in the market game, may not
be followed by everyone playing C in the market game. the result is that nobody
may signal the intention to play C in the market game as players fear that others
will not coordinate on the high pay-oﬀ equilibrium.
In a simultaneous ascending auction the situation is diﬀerent. To analyze this
type of auction design, I use the following notation: xi(x0
i,x k) denotes the bid of
11Some of the arguments presented below are related to the ideas expressed in Ben-Porath and
Dekel (1992, pp. 44) who argue that the timing of the signaling is crucial in n-person games of
common interest.
12player i at a certain moment during the auction when her highest bid so far is x0
i
and the k-highest bid so far is xk; moreover, the notation pi(e x1,e x2..,e xk)), indicates
that market behaviour is conditional on the ﬁnal k-highest bids, where e xi denotes
player i’s ﬁnal bid. Player i’s strategy is then denoted by (xi(x0
i,x k),p i(e x1,e x2..,e xk)).
In this case of a simultaneous ascending auction, the following result extends the
analysis of the previous section to the case where there are three or more licenses
for sale.
Theorem 2 In a simultaneous ascending auction of k ≥ 3 licenses the following





n+1} the unique equilibrium that is
consistent with forward induction has e xi ∈ [a − 2 ,a) and pi(x1,x2..,xk)=C,
i =1 ,...,N.
Proof. (sketch)12 The proof eliminates sets of strategies in several consecutive
stages. The ﬁrst and the last step are similar to steps (i)a n d( v) of the proof
of Theorem 1, based on iterative elimination of strategies in a standard auction
game, and are, therefore, not formally given here. In the ﬁrst step all bids with
xi(x0
i,x k) <c 1 − (n +2 )   are eliminated if N ≥ kn+2
n+1.(for a given n). The second
step is also similar to step (ii) of the proof of Theorem 1, based on the idea that
bidding more than one ever could get by playing aggressively in the market game,
i.e., bidding more than dn−1, and playing aggressively in the market game is also
dominated, and therefore, also not formally given here. Steps (iii)a n d( iv)r e q u i r e
some modiﬁcations and basically have to be replcaed by an iterative procedure.
To this end, suppose we have executed the ﬁrst two steps of the elimination pro-
cedure and that the auction has proceeded so far that x0
i and xk are well-deﬁned.13 I
then claim that any strategy (xi(x0
i,x k),p i(x1,x2..,xk))t h a ta s s i g n spi(x1,x2..,xk)=
A for some value of xk−1 ≥ dk−1 is weakly dominated by (e xi(x0
i,x k), e pi(x1,x2..,xk))
with xi = xi and e pi(x1,x2..,xk)=C whenever xk−1 ≥ dk−1 and e pi(x1,x2..,xk)=
pi(x1,x2..,xk) otherwise.
12When I mention pay-oﬀs in this proof, I implicitly assume that the pay-oﬀs to a player under
consideration are not aﬀected by future bidding in the auction by himself or any other player.
Future bidding will never make the lower bid better than the higher bid and as I claim that higher
bids dominate lower bids, the argument will never be reversed when future bids would be taken
into account.
13In case bidder i has not bid yet or if less than k diﬀerent players have bid, one can set x0
i =0
and/or xk =0 .
13T op r o v et h i sc l a i m ,n o t et h a ta l ls t r a t e g i e s( xi,p i(x1,x2..,xk))w i t hxi ≥ dn−1
that survived IEDS up to this stage have pi(x1,x2..,xk)=C because of step (ii).
There are two cases then to consider: xi <x k and xi = xk.14 In the ﬁrst case,
both strategies yield a pay-oﬀ of 0. In the second case, let us denote by m the
number of players with a bid equal to xi. There are two subcases to be considered:
xk−1 ≥ dk−1 w h i c ha c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁr s ts t r a t e g yi sf o l l o w e db ypi(x1,x2..,xk)=A
and all other values of xk−1. In the ﬁrst subcase, the overall pay-oﬀ of the ﬁrst
strategy is (dk−1 − xi)/m,w h e r e a st h ep a y - o ﬀ of the second strategy is strictly
larger, namely (a − xi)/m. In the second subcase, the actions prescribed by both
strategies are identical and, therefore, the pay-oﬀsa r ee q u a l .
The above argument assures that if k − 1 players bid an amount larger than
or equal to dk−1 in the auction, all k players proceeding to the second stage of
the game will choose to play cooperatively. The next step, similar to sytep (iv) of
the proof of Theorem 1, argues that if there are already k − 2 bids above dk−1 all
strategies that prescribe players to bid less than dk−1 in the auction are iteratively
dominated. To make the claim more precise, I use notation similar to that in the
p r o o fo fs t e p( iv) of Theorem 1 with, e.g., b SC(0) = {(xi(x0
i,x k),p i(x1,x2..,xk))|
xi(x0
i,x k) >c− (n +2 )   and pi(x1,x2..,xk)=C if x1 ≥ dk−1}.S o ,t h en e x tc l a i m ,
similar to step (iv)o ft h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 ,i st h ef o l l o w i n g :F i xa0 ≤ k ≤ KC
and b SC(k). Given that players’ strategies are restricted to b SC(k), all strategies in
e SC(k) are weakly dominated by the strategy (xi(x0
i,x k),p i(x1,x2..,xk)) with dk−1 ≤
xi(x0
i,x k) <d k−1 +   and pi(x1,x2..,xk)=C for all (x1,x2..,xk) .
To prove this claim we should consider for each k ≥ 0 three situations. Either
xk ≥ dk−1 +  , or b x(k) <x 2 <d k−1 +  ,o rb x(k)=x2. In the ﬁrst case, all strategies
in e SC(k) as well as the dominating strategy itself yield a pay-oﬀ of 0. In the second
case, all strategies in e SC(k) yield a pay-oﬀ of 0, whereas the dominating strategy
yields a pay-oﬀ larger than a − dk−1 −   d u et ot h ef a c tt h a ts t e p( iii) implies that
if k − 1 bidders bid an amount higher than dk−1,p l a y e r sp l a yC.I nt h et h i r dc a s e ,
the pay-oﬀ of the dominating strategy is still larger than a − dk−1 −  ,w h e r e a st h e
pay-oﬀ of choosing a strategy in e SC(k) cannot be larger than k(a−c1+(n+2) )/N.
When N satisﬁes the condition mentioned in the Theorem, the ﬁrst pay-oﬀ is not
14Note that the case xi >x k is covered by (the not explicitly treated) step (ii)a b o v ea si t
implies that xi ≥ xk−1 ≥ dk−1.
14smaller than the second.
The rest of the proof of step (iv) proceeds by induction on j: if there are already
k − j bids above dk−1 all strategies that prescribe players to bid less than dk−1 in
the auction are iteratively dominated. The above two claims together argue that
this induction claim is true for j =2 . Arguments similar to these two claims, and
using the fact that players know that if they signal others will follow, can be used
t oa r g u et h a ti ta l s oh o l d sf o rj =3 ,...,k.
The fact that the condition on N becomes tighter, when comparing Theorems 1
a n d2 ,i su n d e r s t o o di fo n er e a l i z e st h ef a c tt h a tw i t hm o r el i c e n s e sb e i n ga u c t i o n e d ,
the chance of getting one of them increases if players bid relatively low amounts. The
”jump” that has to be made in order to signal future cooperative behaviour remains
the same, however, and therefore, the cost of making such a ”jump bid”. The main
argument, however, remains the same: if someone bids an amount during the auction
that he cannot hope to receive in the market game by playing aggressively, i.e., if he
bids more than dn−1, then he signals future cooperative behavior. Also, during the
auction stage ﬁrms compete away their future proﬁts, like in the Theorem stated in
the previous section.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown in the context of a simple model how auctions may lead
to high prices in the after-auction market. The main idea is that by bidding more
than the proﬁts a ﬁrm could possibly make by playing a competitive strategy in
the market game, a ﬁrm signals that he will act cooperatively in the market game.
Other ﬁrms pick up this signal and play cooperatively as well if they take part in
the market game. As during the auction, ﬁrms compete to get a license to operate
in the after-auction market, ﬁrms outbid each other during the auction game. Thus,
all ﬁrms bid more than they possibly could make by competing in the after-auction
market. When two licenses will be sold, this argument holds true for both sealed-
bid auctions and simultaneous ascending auctions; when three or more licenses are
sold, the argument fails to hold for sealed-bid auctions, but continuous to hold for
simultaneous ascending auctions
15It is important to note that some conditions are necessary to make the argument
work: (i) there should not be too much uncertainty about future market pay-oﬀs,
(ii) equilibrium behavior in the market should be indetermined in the sense that mul-
tiple equilibria in the market game exists, (iii) the winning bids should be publicly
observable, and (iv) the number of contestants in the auction should be relatively
large. I will brieﬂy comment on the ﬁrst three points below; the fourth issue has
already been discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Concerning uncertainty, the argument made allows for some form of pay-oﬀ
uncertainty as long as the maximum pay-oﬀ from competing aggressively in the
market stage is smaller than the minimum possible pay-oﬀ of all ﬁrms cooperating
in the market place. In case there is too much uncertainty about future pay-oﬀs,
auction fees cannot be interpreted as a signal of future market stage behaviour. In
the case of the European UMTS-auctions, one may argue that they were held at
such an early point in time that it was highly uncertain how much proﬁts were to
b eg a i n e d .I ft h i si ss o ,t h ea b o v ea r g u m e n td o e sn o ta p p l y .
When there is a unique equilibrium in the market stage, signalling future behav-
ior does not make much sense as future behavior is fully determined by the market
constellation itself. Hence, a necessary condition for our argument to work is the
existence of multiple market equilibria. Finally, when the winning bids are not
made public, ﬁrms cannot condition their market behavior on these winning bids.
Accordingly, the ﬁr m sc a n n o tu s et h e i rb i d st os i g n a lf u t u r ei n t e n t i o n si nt h i sc a s e .
It is not crucial to the argument, however, that ﬁrms are identical. For example,
one could introduce a private value component in the following way: for any v =
a,b,c or d, one may write vi = v +  v
i,w h e r e v
i is private knowledge and drawn
from some distribution F with support [ v, v]. This makes clear that the pay-oﬀso f
cooperating or competing in the market place may depend on the ﬁrms’ identity. It
is relatively easy to see that if the private value component is not too large, more
precisely if a− a >d+ d, the core results hold true. In this case, the winning ﬁrms
a r el i k e l yt om a k es o m ep r o ﬁts, however.
There are several interesting policy issues concerning auction design that come
out of this paper. One issue that arises is with respect to the optimal choice of bid
increment. It is easy to see that the lower bound on the number of ﬁrms stated in
the Theorem is increasing in the bid increment  . This means that by choosing a
16larger bid increment, the auctioneer (government authorities) may try to prevent
signalling in the sense discussed in this paper.
Second, it is interesting to observe that by announcing the winning bids, the
government may facilitate coordinating on the high proﬁt (price) equilibrium in the
sense discussed in this paper. If only the identity of the winning bidders is revealed,
but not their bids, ﬁrms cannot directly infer what the other ﬁrm has paid and
therefore they cannot condition market behaviour on the bids. In this case, the
argument developped in this paper breaks down.
Finally, coordinating on the high proﬁt (price) equilibrium may be diﬃcult to
detect by competition authorities as no explicit communication is needed. Moreover,
the ﬁrms may argue that the auction has forced them to pay so much that if they
don’t coordinate on the high proﬁt equilibrium, they will go bankrupt. If bankruptcy
of crucial ﬁrms in an economy is a serious concern for competition authorities, there
is not much the authorities can do after the auction has taken place. Of course, the
authorities may threaten ex ante that they will introduce severe punishments, but
one may wonder whether this is a credible threat given the observation that ex post
the authorties may not ﬁnd it optimal to punish.
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